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EXAMINING JURORS: APPLYING 
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS TO VOIR DIRE 
IN CAPITAL CASES, A FIRST LOOK 
BARBARA O’BRIEN, CATHERINE M. GROSSO  
& ABIJAH P. TAYLOR∗ 
Scholarship about racial disparities in jury selection is extensive, but 
the data about how parties examine potential jurors in actual trials is limited.  
This study of jury selection for 792 potential jurors across twelve randomly 
selected North Carolina capital cases uses conversation analysis to examine 
the process that produces decisions about who serves on juries.  To examine 
how race influences conversations in voir dire, we adapted the Roter 
Interaction Analysis System, a widely used framework for understanding the 
dynamics of patient–clinician communication during clinical encounters, to 
the legal setting for the first time.  This method allows us to document the 
conversational dynamics of actual questioning of potential jurors that 
precedes the decision to seat or strike a juror, or to excuse her for cause.  
Our preliminary analysis of this uniquely rich archival data suggests ways 
in which the discourse of jury selection varies by race, and provides the 
foundation for future work looking at the ways in which the evaluation of 
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fitness for jury service itself is skewed and contributes to racial disparities in 
jury selection. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 689 
I. RACE DISCRIMINATION AND JURY SELECTION .............................. 692 
A.  Discrimination in Jury Selection ....................................... 692 
B.  Stereotypes and Racial Bias .............................................. 695 
II. CONVERSATION ANALYSIS ............................................................ 698 
III. THE CURRENT STUDY .................................................................. 701 
A.  Sample Design .................................................................. 701 
1. Death Penalty Reservations Subset ............................ 702 
2. Prior Criminal Accusation ......................................... 703 
3. Hardship Arising from Jury Service .......................... 704 
4. Employment with Police or Prosecutors .................... 704 
B.  Conversation Coding ......................................................... 705 
1. Adapting the RIAS Rubric to Legal Analysis ............ 706 
2. Coding & Reliability .................................................. 706 
3. Global Affect Rating .................................................. 708 
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DATA ....................................................... 708 
A. The Study Sample ............................................................ 708 
B. Capacities of the Coding Scheme .................................... 711 
1. Qualities of Speech .................................................... 712 
2. Moving Beyond Individual Variables to Look at 
Patterns or Systemic Variation ................................... 713 
3. Working with Single Cases, In Depth ........................ 717 
V. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION ......................................................... 724 
APPENDIX 1.  DIRECTORY OF TEXT CODES ....................................... 726 
APPENDIX 2.  INITIAL CONVERSATION PROFILE DEFINITION ............ 732 
	  
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES 
Table 1.  Study Sample by Target Group and Case 
Table 2.  Study Sample by Jury Selection Outcome and Case 
Table 3.  Study Sample by Rate of Strike and Cause Removals by Race 
Table 4.  Study Sample by Average Number of Utterances and Amount of 
Speech    
Table 5.  Presence of Open and Closed Question Codes by Voir Dire Section 
across All Cases 
Table 6.  Prosecutor/Juror, Defense/Juror, and Judge/Juror Speech Ratios by 
Case, Overall (col. B) and by Race (cols. C-F) 
O’BRIEN 10/10/17  5:44 PM 
2017] EXAMINING JURORS 689 
 
Figure 1.  Conversation Profile by Race, the Case of John Badgett 
 
INTRODUCTION 
While scholarship about jury selection is extensive, the data about how 
parties examine potential jurors in actual trials is limited.1  This study goes 
behind the outcomes of peremptory strike decisions documented in our 
earlier work to examine the process that produces those decisions.2  We use 
conversation analysis to document the questioning of potential jurors that 
precedes the decision to seat or strike a juror, or to excuse her for cause.  Our 
preliminary analysis of uniquely rich archival data suggests ways in which 
the discourse of jury selection varies by race, and begins to suggest that the 
evaluation of fitness for jury service itself is skewed and contributes to racial 
disparities in jury selection.  This article provides the foundation for future 
work in that promising vein. 
Jury selection unfolds in stages.  The judge and sometimes the attorneys 
first question potential jurors to establish their ability to be fair.  Any juror 
who cannot be fair will be excused. Jurors next face peremptory challenges 
by both parties.  Parties may dismiss potential jurors with a peremptory 
challenge for any reason or no reason at all, except race or gender.  In this 
way, the parties feel confident that the system is fair.3 
The process has, however, been plagued by racism.  In Batson v. 
Kentucky, the Court issued a clear constitutional prohibition against 
consideration of race in strike decisions, holding that purposefully excluding 
people from jury service based on race was unconstitutional and undermined 
public confidence in the justice system.4  The Batson Court built on a 
 
1  A significant body of experimental work has looked at the role of race in mock jury 
selection.  For a review, see Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race and Jury 
Selection: Psychological Perspectives on the Peremptory Challenge Debate, 63 AM. PSYCHOL. 
527, 527 (2008).  Anecdotal evidence of discrimination also exists.  In a 1986 training video, 
for example, Philadelphia prosecutor Jack McMahon emphasized the importance of striking 
certain kinds of jurors, such as “blacks from low-income areas” and blacks who are “real 
educated.” David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman & Neil Alan Weiner, The 
Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 
3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 41–43 (2001) (citing Jury Selection with Jack McMahon, 1986 
(transcript of DATV Productions video tape, n.d.)) [hereinafter Baldus et al.]. 
2  Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming 
Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital Trials, 97 
IOWA L. REV. 1531 (2012). 
3  NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 89–90, 93–95 
(2007) (describing this aspect of jury selection). 
4  476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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significant line of cases seeking to make juries more inclusive.5  
Nevertheless, strong evidence suggests that improper factors continue to play 
a role in jury selection.6  While the Supreme Court established an elaborate 
three-step process for challenging a strike as based on race, parties can readily 
defeat the challenge in the third step by proffering a plausible race-neutral 
reason for the strike decision.7  Trial courts rarely reject these reasons as 
disingenuous or “pretextual.”8 
The Batson regime suffers from a major design flaw as it was intended 
to counter intentional discrimination.9  Accordingly, attorneys strongly deny 
 
5  See generally Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (holding that a defendant could 
raise a claim that the prosecutor had discriminated in jury selection if he or she could show 
systematic evidence of discrimination in selecting trial juries); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
U.S. 303 (1880) (holding that the West Virginia statute limiting jury service to whites violated 
the Constitution). 
6  See, e.g., Baldus et al., supra note 1, at 121–30 (summarizing findings concluding that 
venire member race was “a major determinant in the use of peremptory challenges by both 
prosecutors and defense counsel” in Philadelphia County capital murder trials); Grosso & 
O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1554 (presenting the results of a fully controlled logistical model 
showing that qualified black jurors face odds 2.48 higher than all other jurors of being struck); 
Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or Gender Discrimination? Some 
Data from One County, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 695, 697–99 (1999) (finding that race played a 
significant role in the exercise of peremptory challenges by both prosecutors and defense 
counsel in one county in North Carolina); Billy M. Turner, Rickie D. Lovell, John C. Young 
& William F. Denny, Race and Peremptory Challenges during Voir Dire: Do Prosecution and 
Defense Agree?, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 61, 63 (1986) (presenting findings showing that race played 
a significant role in the exercise of peremptory challenges in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana) 
[hereinafter Turner et al.]; see also Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747–56 (2016) 
(reviewing the record of discrimination in the selection of Foster’s jury). 
7  A party raising a Batson challenge must first establish a prima facie case of intentional 
discrimination by offering evidence that the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to exclude 
potential jurors because of their race or gender.  If the prima facie case is established, the 
prosecutor must provide a neutral explanation for the strike decisions at issue.  The proffered 
explanation must be more than a bare assertion of good faith, but it need not be a compelling 
reason or one that impacts members of all races evenly.  The trial court must then determine 
whether the proffered reason was genuine or merely a pretext for racial discrimination.  Snyder 
v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 278 (2005); Batson, 
476 U.S. at 93–99. 
8  See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 278 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. 
Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More than the Unapologetically Bigoted or 
Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1116–30 (2011); Kenneth J. 
Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory 
Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 483–84 (1996). 
9  See Vidmar & Hans, supra note 3, at 97 (describing the procedure outlined by the 
Supreme Court in Batson and noting that an attorney must assert that she believes the other 
side has removed a juror on the basis of race to raise a challenge). 
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any suggestion that they engage in intentional discrimination.10  This may or 
may not be true.  Substantial social-psychological evidence supports the 
possibility that people—including prosecutors, defense counsel, and 
judges—harbor stereotypes about race that bear on people’s attractiveness as 
jurors.11  Evidence also suggests that both prosecutors and defense counsel 
use race as a proxy for bias, despite the constitutional prohibition.12  In these 
instances, voir dire may serve as a tool to develop race-neutral justifications 
for the anticipated race-based strikes. 
Significant psychological research suggests that racial bias also operates 
below the level of conscious awareness to affect people’s perceptions and 
behaviors.13  In these instances, stereotypes about which demographic groups 
are more or less likely to convict and ultimately sentence a defendant to death 
operate as an implicit starting hypothesis that informs how they collect 
information during the voir dire process.14  The information collected then 
reinforces the stereotype and increases the likelihood that racial stereotypes 
influence strike decisions.15 
Either way, the voir dire process might contribute to the improper 
influence of race.  This research project seeks—in time—to document that 
contribution as part of a larger effort to limit the influence of race on jury 
selection.  We coded the process of jury selection for 792 potential jurors 
 
10  See, e.g., Transcript of Closing Argument at 2590–92, State v. Robinson, 368 N.C. 569 
(2012) (No. 91 CRS 23143). 
11  Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Mapping the Racial Bias of the White Male Capital Juror: 
Jury Composition and the “Empathic Divide,” 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 69, 71–72 (2011); Neil A. 
Rector, R. Michael Bagby & Robert Nicholson, The Effect of Prejudice and Judicial 
Ambiguity on Defendant Guilt Ratings, 133 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 651, 652 (1993); Laura T. 
Sweeney & Craig Haney, The Influence of Race on Sentencing: A Meta-­‐Analytic Review of 
Experimental Studies, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 179, 182 (1992). 
12  See e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016) (discussing evidence that 
prosecutors targeted black jurors for exclusion and sought to seat as few black jurors as 
possible); see also Baldus et al., supra note 1, at 41 n.133. 
13  Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled 
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 6 (1989); Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, 
Prejudice, and Discrimination, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 357–411 
(Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
14  See Fiske, supra note 13, at 362; Lucy C. Johnston & C. Neil Macrae, Changing Social 
Stereotypes: The Case of the Information Seeker, 24 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 581 (1994); Mark 
Snyder & William B. Swann, Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social Interaction, 36 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1202, 1202 (1978). 
15  See Andrew R. Todd, Adam D. Galinsky & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Perspective Taking 
Undermines Stereotype Maintenance Processes: Evidence from Social Memory, Behavior 
Explanation, and Information Solicitation, 30 SOC. COGNITION 94, 96 (2012) [hereinafter 
Todd et al.]. 
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across twelve randomly selected North Carolina cases in which the defendant 
received the death penalty.16  We coded these conversations according to a 
rigorously tested method of conversation analysis in which every complete 
thought expressed receives a discrete pre-defined code.17 
In this article, we explain how we adapted this methodology to jury 
selection, and then present an overview of the data.  In Part I, we review the 
evidence that despite the Supreme Court’s clear prohibition, race continues 
to matter in jury selection and explain why this may be so in light of the 
psychological processes at work.  Part II reviews the history of conversation 
analysis.  Part III explains the theory and details of the purposive sample 
frame. It then explains how we adapted the conversation coding methodology 
to this project and provides coding details.  In Part IV, we present our sample 
and offer a closer look at ways in which the coding scheme can be used in 
analysis.  In Part V, we discuss the implications of these patterns and future 
avenues of research. 
I. RACE DISCRIMINATION AND JURY SELECTION 
Despite the Supreme Court’s efforts in Batson to curb racial bias in the 
use of peremptory strikes, stark racial disparities persist.18  While racism 
continues to influence jury selection,19 the disparities also arise from other 
more-subtle psychological processes.20 
A.  DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION 
Jury selection involves two distinct reviews of potential jurors.21  First, 
a trial judge should remove any potential juror for “cause” if there is evidence 
 
16  See infra IV for an explanation of how we selected the sample of cases to analyze. 
17  Public health researchers originally developed this system to analyze communication 
in healthcare settings. Debra L. Roter & Susan Larson, The Relationship Between Residents’ 
and Attending Physicians’ Communication during Primary Care Visits: An Illustrative Use of 
the Roter Interaction Analysis System, 13 HEALTH COMM. 33, 34 (2001). 
18  476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also supra note 6 (collecting studies showing the influence of 
race in jury selection). 
19  See, e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1744–45 (2016) (documenting 
prosecutors’ explicit references to potential jurors’ race and suitability for jury service); 
Baldus et al., supra note 1, at 41 n.133. 
     20  See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988) (analyzing the influence of unconscious racism in charging, 
sentencing, and jury selection). 
21  North Carolina law provides an example of the process described in this paragraph. See 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212 (2009). 
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that the juror cannot be impartial and follow the judge’s instructions.22  There 
is no limit to the number of jurors who may be removed for cause, but the 
basis for doing so must be explicit and fall within specific categories relating 
to the juror’s fitness to serve (e.g., pre-existing opinions about the case or a 
relationship with one of the parties).23  Second, each party may peremptorily 
remove, or “strike,” a limited number of potential jurors for any reason other 
than race or gender, and typically without explanation.24  While each review 
serves a well-established purpose of ensuring a fair and unbiased jury, the 
discretion afforded parties in exercising their peremptory strikes heightens 
the risk that improper factors such as race will influence decision making.25 
Although consideration of race in strike decisions is constitutionally 
prohibited, research in both law reviews and social science journals indicates 
that race continues to play a role.26  The difficulty of uncovering racial bias—
whether deliberate or unconscious—has led many to conclude that the Batson 
regime cannot counter discrimination in jury selection.27  Many scholars and 
several judges have called for the wholesale abolition of peremptory strikes.28  
 
22  See, e.g., North Carolina v. Wilkinson, 474 S.E. 375, 397 (1996) (noting that the 
“primary goal of the jury selection process is to ensure selection of a jury comprised only of 
persons who will render a fair and impartial verdict” and that removal for cause is appropriate 
if the juror is unable to render a verdict in accordance with the law) (quoting North Carolina 
v. Conaway, 453 S.E.2d 824, 839 (1995)). 
23  See, e,g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212(5) & (6). 
24  See, e,g., id. at § 15A-1217; J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (extending 
Batson’s prohibition on race-based peremptory strikes to gender); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (noting that a prosecutor may generally strike a potential juror for any 
reason but race). 
25  See generally Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of 
Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998) (analyzing the risks of discrimination by 
prosecutors or police officers when they have heightened discretion and proposing reforms 
that would limit discretion); Johnson, supra note 19, at 1019 (discussing Justice Powell’s 
observation that the “multiplicity of factors that enter sentencing decisions and the consequent 
need for discretion may make the inference of race-based decisionmaking riskier in the 
sentencing context than where only a few permissible considerations enter into a decision”) 
(citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987)). 
26  See, e.g., Baldus et al., supra note 1, at 121–30; Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2, at 
1554; Rose, supra note 6, at 697–99; Turner et al., supra note 6, at 63. 
27   See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring); Edward S. Adams & 
Christian Lane, Constructing a Jury That Is Both Impartial and Representative: Utilizing 
Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 706–07 (1998); Alan Raphael, 
Discriminatory Jury Selection: Lower Court Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky, 25 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 294, 349 (1989). 
28   Batson, 476 U.S. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring); see generally Albert W. Alschuler, 
The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury 
Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989); William G. Childs, The Intersection of Peremptory 
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Others have suggested changes to the Batson regime, such as reducing the 
number of peremptory strikes available to each side, so as to limit the 
opportunity for discrimination.29 
While scholarship about peremptory challenges is extensive, data about 
how parties exercise these challenges in trials is limited.  A significant body 
of experimental work has examined the role of race in mock jury selection.30  
Anecdotal evidence of discrimination also exists.  In a 1986 training video, 
for example, Philadelphia prosecutor Jack McMahon emphasized the 
importance of striking certain kinds of jurors, such as “blacks from low-
income areas” and blacks who are “real educated.”31 
Only a handful of published studies, however, have examined how 
parties strike jurors in actual trials.  Every study of which we are aware found 
substantial racial disparities in both prosecutorial and defense use of 
peremptory challenges.32  In a previous article, we presented evidence of 
racial disparities in jury selection in 173 North Carolina cases in which the 
defendant was sentenced to death. 33  We found that prosecutors in North 
Carolina capital cases between 1990 and 2010 exercised peremptory 
challenges against black potential jurors at twice the rate as jurors of other 
 
Challenges, Challenges for Cause and Harmless Error, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 49 (1999); Morris 
B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 
U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 810 n.2 (1997) (listing judges and academics who have voiced strong 
concerns about peremptory challenges); Vivien Toomey Montz & Craig Lee Montz, The 
Peremptory Challenge: Should It Still Exist—An Examination of Federal and Florida Law, 54 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 451 (1999); Arielle Siebert, Batson v. Kentucky: Application to Whites and 
the Effect on the Peremptory Challenge System, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 307 (1998); 
Amy Wilson, The End of Peremptory Challenges: A Call for Change through Comparative 
Analysis, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 363 (2009). 
29   Adams & Lane, supra note 27, at 739–62; Nathan Koppel, Three Strikes and You’re 
Out? Critics Seek Juror-Dismissal Cap, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 5, 2009, https://	  
www.wsj.com/articles/SB123621836517136247 [https://perma.cc/S36B-FG4A] (quoting 
Iowa law professor David Baldus calling for a three strike limit). 
30  For a review, see Sommers & Norton, supra note 1, at 527 for a review. 
31  Id. 
32   See Baldus et al., supra note 1, at 121–30; Rose, supra note 6, 697–99; Turner et al., 
supra note 6, at 63. 
33   See generally Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2.  This finding was the basis of a North 
Carolina court’s grant of relief to vacate the death sentence of Marcus Robinson and resentence 
him to life in prison (Order Granting Appropriate Relief at 44-46, State v. Robinson, 91-CRS-
23143 (Sup. Ct. N.C. Apr. 20, 2012) and subsequent grant of relief to three more defendants 
on December 13, 2012 (Order Granting Motions for Appropriate Relief at 2, State v. Golphin 
et al., 97-CRS-47314-15 (Sup. Ct. N.C. Dec. 13, 2012)).  The North Carolina Supreme Court 
remanded both decisions for new hearings on December 18, 2015.  The court found procedural 
errors in each decision.  State v. Robinson, 780 S.E.2d 151, 151 (2015); State v. Augustine et 
al., 780 S.E.2d 552, 552 (2015). 
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races, even after controlling for alternative grounds for removal. 
We are not aware of any studies that have examined racial disparities 
and the process of voir dire.  In fact, very few studies have focused on voir 
dire.34  Most studies in this area focus on the structure of voir dire, such as 
the relative benefit of judge versus attorney questioning or of individual 
versus group questioning of jurors.35  Cathy Johnson and Craig Haney 
surveyed potential jurors and observed the process of voir dire in four felony 
trials.36  The researchers then coded voir dire transcripts for personal-
biographical content and various kinds of instructional communications 
about the jury system and the role of jurors to evaluate the effectiveness of 
jury selection by either the prosecution or defense in identifying ideal 
jurors.37  Their focus, however, was on the structure of voir dire and its 
outcomes in light of frequent criticisms that the process is unduly long and 
misused by attorneys who seek to indoctrinate potential jurors.  At least one 
other study has evaluated how the process of voir dire socializes jurors,38 but 
we are unaware of any that examine nuanced differences in questioning 
pertaining to observed racial disparities. 
B.  STEREOTYPES AND RACIAL BIAS 
A body of psychological literature indicates that decision makers tend 
to seek and interpret information in ways that will support existing 
hypotheses.39 In the context of stereotyping, this phenomenon is known as 
stereotype maintenance.40  Psychologists have demonstrated the impact of 
confirmation biases and information seeking behavior in experimental 
settings.41  We are not, however, aware of any research that has replicated 
 
34   Cathy Johnson & Craig Haney, Felony Voir Dire: An Exploratory Study of Its Content 
and Effect, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 487, 487 (1994) (noting that voir dire has seldom been 
studied). 
35   See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 3, at 89 for a review. 
36   Johnson & Haney, supra note 34, at 491. 
37   Id. at 491–92. 
38   See generally Robert W. Balch, Curt Taylor Griffiths, Edwin L. Hall & L. Thomas 
Winfree, The Socialization of Jurors the Voir Dire as a Rite of Passage, 4 J. CRIM. JUST. 271 
(1976). 
39   Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information 
in Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211, 225 (1987); Raymond S. Nickerson, 
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 
175 (1998). 
40  Todd et al., supra note 15, at 95–96. 
41  Barbara O’Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that Aggravate and 
Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 315, 
318–28 (2009). 
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these findings in either experimental or applied research on jury selection.  If 
such a process is at work when attorneys select jurors, a pre-existing belief 
about whether a potential juror is likely to favor or disfavor the prosecution 
or the defense will influence the discourse—namely the line and tone of 
examination—that takes place during voir dire. 
Confirmation bias is the tendency to support a hypothesis by seeking 
consistent evidence while minimizing inconsistent evidence.42  This kind of 
bias can lead to testing a hypothesis in a way that is likely to support it,43 or 
to searching for new information in a biased or biasing manner.44  
Confirmation bias may lead police investigating a crime to focus on 
information consistent with the guilt of a suspect, and to minimize evidence 
pointing them in a different direction.45 Confirmation bias is not deliberate,46 
and can be present even when there is no motivation to prefer a particular 
hypothesis.47 
Psychologists have also demonstrated that confirmation bias can serve 
to reinforce stereotypes. Stereotypes are categorizations that allow people to 
both process information more efficiently and to generate hypotheses about 
how members of a particular group are likely to think and behave.48 This 
efficiency, however, comes at a cost in that it can lead perceivers to relegate 
their targets to caricatures, and also because these perceptions are often 
resistant to disconfirming information.49 
There are several mechanisms at work in maintaining stereotypes.50 One 
stereotype maintenance process particularly relevant in the voir dire context 
 
42   Nickerson, supra note 39, at 175. 
43   Klayman & Ha, supra note 39, at 225. 
44  See generally James Friedrich, Primary Error Detection and Minimization (PEDMIN) 
Strategies in Social Cognition: A Reinterpretation of Confirmation Bias Phenomena, 
100 PSYCHOL. REV. 298 (1993); Dieter Frey, Recent Research on Selective Exposure to 
Information, 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 41 (1986); Eva Jonas, Stefan 
Schulz-Hardt, Dieter Frey & Norman Thelen, Confirmation Bias in Sequential Information 
Search after Preliminary Decisions: An Expansion of Dissonance Theoretical Research on 
Selective Exposure to Information, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 557 (2001). 
45   See generally DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROCESS (2012); O’Brien, supra note 41. 
46   Bryan Gibson, David M. Sanbonmatsu & Steven S. Posavac, The Effects of Selective 
Hypothesis Testing on Gambling, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 126, 127 (1997). 
47   Nickerson, supra note 39, at 176. 
48   C. Neil Macrae, Alan B. Milne & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypes as Energy-
Saving Devices: A Peek Inside the Cognitive Toolbox, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
37, 38 (1994). 
49   Todd et al., supra note 15, at 95–96. 
50   See generally id. 
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involves the solicitation and interpretation of information.51  People often 
seek information that confirms rather than disconfirms what they expect 
based on the stereotype they hold.52  Moreover, to the extent perceivers 
receive stereotype-inconsistent information, they often seek to reconcile that 
information with what they expect to see or otherwise minimize the 
stereotype-inconsistent information’s value.53  In other words, the stereotypes 
people hold influence the information people seek and how they interpret 
new information.54 
If attorneys start with the hypothesis that black jurors are more likely to 
have experiences and attitudes that would undermine their willingness to 
convict and impose the death penalty, and if attorneys act consistently with 
research in other domains that shows that people often search for evidence 
that confirms rather than disconfirms an initial hypothesis, then we should 
observe disparities not only in whom attorneys choose to strike or pass, but 
also in how they question jurors.  This tendency would undermine not only 
the fairness of the process by contributing to racial disparities, but also its 
accuracy by skewing the evaluation of fitness for jury service. 
Moreover, even people who consciously endorse egalitarian views may 
exhibit subtle bias in interracial interactions.55  Psychologists John Dovidio 
and Samuel Gaertner call this bias “aversive racism,” and explain that even 
people who harbor little or no conscious racial animus still have unconscious 
biases that manifest in subtle, unintentional differences in how they interact 
with people of other races, particularly “negative decisions in complex 
situations in which bias could be attributed to factors other than race.”56 
A complex situation in which a number of factors besides racial bias can 
justify a decision describes jury selection perfectly.  A longstanding criticism 
 
51  Fiske, supra note 13, at 362; Johnston & McCrae, supra note 14; Snyder & Swann, 
supra note 14, at 1205.  
52  Nickerson, supra note 39, at 176. 
53   Todd et al., supra note 15, at 95–96. 
54   Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making and Memory: 
Testing Process Models of Stereotype Use, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 726, 726–28 
(1988). 
55  See generally Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in 
PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 1, 61–89 (Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio 
eds., 1986); Nao Hagiwara, Louis A. Penner, Richard Gonzalez, Susan Eggly, John F. 
Dovidio, Samuel L. Gaertner, Tessa West & Terrance L. Albrecht, Racial Attitudes, 
Physician–Patient Talk Time Ratio, and Adherence in Racially Discordant Medical 
Interactions, 87 SOC. SCI. & MED. 123 (2013). 
56  Louis A. Penner, John F. Dovidio, Tessa V. West, Samuel L. Gaertner, Terrance L. 
Albrecht, Rhonda K. Dailey & Tsveti Markova, Aversive Racism and Medical Interactions 
with Black Patients: A Field Study, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 436, 436 (2010). 
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of the Batson regime is that the second prong, which requires the striking 
party to proffer a race-neutral reason for the strike, is too easy to satisfy.57  If 
psychological processes like stereotype maintenance and aversive racism are 
in fact driving the racial disparities in how prosecutors decide to use their 
peremptory strikes, then we should expect to see subtle differences in the 
interactions that precede those decisions.  We assess those potential 
differences through conversation analysis. 
II. CONVERSATION ANALYSIS 
Conversation analysis describes a group of methodologies that 
document interpersonal interactions at a fine level of detail.58  These 
methodologies focus on how all parties to an interaction speak and participate 
in an exchange.59 
Although conversation analysis was initially used to understand 
informal interactions, researchers soon recognized its value to analyze 
communication in institutional settings.60  In particular, researchers interested 
in the dynamics of doctor-patient interactions sought to adapt the method to 
that setting.61  One frequently used method of conversation analysis in 
clinical settings is the Roter Interaction Analysis System (“RIAS”).62  Debra 
 
57  Bellin & Semitsu state as follows: 
[W]e now consider the charade that has become the Batson process. The State may provide the 
trial court with a series of pat race-neutral reasons for exercise of peremptory challenges. . . . 
Surely, new prosecutors are given a manual, probably entitled, ‘Handy Race-Neutral Explanations’ 
or ‘20 Time-Tested Race-Neutral Explanations.’ It might include: too old, too young, divorced, 
‘long, unkempt hair,’ free-lance writer, religion, social worker, renter, lack of family contact, 
attempting to make eye-contact with defendant, ‘lived in an area consisting predominantly of 
apartment complexes,’ single, over-educated, lack of maturity, improper demeanor, unemployed, 
improper attire, juror lived alone, misspelled place of employment, living with girlfriend, 
unemployed spouse, spouse employed as school teacher, employment as part-time barber, 
friendship with city council member, failure to remove hat . . . . 
Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 8, at 1090 (quoting People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65–66 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996)). 
58  John Heritage & Douglas W. Maynard, Introduction: Analyzing Interaction between 
Doctors and Patients in Primary Care, in COMMUNICATION IN MEDICAL CARE: INTERACTION 
BETWEEN PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS AND PATIENTS 1–21 (John Heritage & Douglas W. 
Maynard eds., 2006). 
59  Douglas W. Maynard & John Heritage, Conversation Analysis, Doctor–Patient 
Interaction and Medical Communication, 39 MED. EDUC. 428, 428 (2005). 
60  Id. 
61  Id. 
62  See generally Richard M. Frankel, Cracking the Code: Theory and Method in Clinical 
Communication Analysis, 13 HEALTH COMM. 101 (2001). For a list of articles applying this 
methodology, see Resources: Bibliography and Abstracts of RIAS Studies through 2016, 
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Roter developed this system through a meta-analysis of research on patient-
doctor conversations.63  RIAS provides a way to characterize in a highly 
detailed way the verbal interactions that occur in a conversation.64  Coding 
categories are determined in advance and tailored to the specific type of 
exchange under analysis.  The exchange is treated as a process that takes 
place through specific acts—i.e., phrases, questions, and answers—that are 
amenable to categorization.65 
Researchers have used RIAS to analyze racial disparities in patient-
doctor communications.  For instance, Mary Catherine Beach and colleagues 
(including Roter) reviewed recorded visits between doctors and patients, and 
coded the conversations for the presence or absence of various factors (e.g., 
verbal dominance, socio-emotional communication, question asking, 
information giving) to analyze differences in interactions by patient race.66  
Beach and colleagues used RIAS to find that healthcare providers were more 
verbally dominant when interacting with black HIV patients compared to 
white HIV patients.67 Using the same method, Beach and colleagues found 
that healthcare providers engaged in less psychosocial talk with Latino 
patients treated for HIV relative to their non-Latino counterparts.68 
 
RIASWORKS, http://www.riasworks.com/resources_a.html (last visited July 2, 2016). 
63   Roter & Larson, supra note 17, at 37. 
64   See generally Debra Roter & Susan Larson, The Roter Interaction Analysis System 
(RIAS): Utility and Flexibility for Analysis of Medical Interactions, 46 PATIENT EDUC. & 
COUNSELING 243 (2002). 
65  Anssi Peräkylä, Two Traditions of Interaction Research, 43 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 
3 (2004). 
66  See generally Mary Catherine Beach, Somnath Saha, P. Todd Korthuis, Victoria Sharp, 
Jonathon Cohn, Ira Wilson, Susan Eggly, Lisa A. Cooper, Debra Roter, Andrea Sankar & 
Richard Moore, Differences in Patient-Provider Communication for Hispanic Compared to 
Non-Hispanic White Patients in HIV Care, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 682 (2010) [hereinafter 
Differences in Patient-Provider Communication]; Mary Catherine Beach, Somnath Saha, P. 
Todd Korthuis, Victoria Sharp, Jonathon Cohn, Ira Wilson, Susan Eggly, Lisa A. Cooper, 
Debra Roter, Andrea Sankar & Richard Moore, Patient-Provider Communication Differs for 
Black Compared to White HIV-Infected Patients, 15 AIDS & BEHAV. 805 (2011) [hereinafter 
Patient-Provider Communication Differs]. 
67  Patient-Provider Communication Differs, supra note 66, at 809. 
68  Differences in Patient-Provider Communication, supra note 66, at 685. For other 
examples of research using conversation analysis to examine racial differences in healthcare 
provider-patient interactions, see Margarita Alegría, Debra L. Roter, Anne Valentine, Chih-
nan Chen, Xinliang Li, Julia Lin, Daniel Rosen, Sheri Lapatin, Sharon-Lise Normand, Susan 
Larson & Patrick E. Shrout, Patient-Clinician Ethnic Concordance and Communication in 
Mental Health Intake Visits, 93 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 188, 190 (2013) (using RIAS 
to compare communication patterns between mental health-care providers and patients of the 
same racial and ethnic groups to those in which the provider and patient did not belong to the 
same group); Edward P. Havranek, Rebecca Hanratty, Channing Tate, L. Miriam Dickinson, 
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The adaptation of this system to a legal setting provides unique 
opportunities to compare observed racial disparities in analyses of medical 
conversations with observed disparities in the courtroom.  Like doctor-patient 
interactions, the jury selection process involves a clear hierarchy in which 
one of the actors (i.e., the doctor, or the judges and attorneys) plays the role 
of an expert seeking information from the other partner to the exchange (i.e., 
the patient, or the juror) to make a diagnosis of sorts.69  While the subject 
matter and some of the motivations differ, in both instances the party with 
greater expertise about the context attempts to assess the other through a 
series of questions and follow-up.  Neither the series of questions nor the 
follow-up is a casual conversation, as both the medical interview and voir 
dire have a traditional structure and content.70  In essence, both doctors and 
legal professionals are testing hypotheses about the patients or jurors to 
determine the best course of action in light of their goals (how to treat an 
illness, or whether to strike or pass a juror).  In addition, the conversation 
serves to educate the patients and potential jurors (providing information 
about a health condition and a treatment plan, or explaining the law they will 
have to apply as jurors).71 
 
John F. Steiner, Geoffrey Cohen & Irene A. Blair, Effect of Values Affirmation on Race-
Discordant Patient-Provider Communication, 21 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1662, 1663–65 
(2012) (using RIAS to measure the effect of an intervention designed to improve 
communication between African-American patients with hypertension and their health care 
providers).  Researchers have also used RIAS to examine the relation between other types of 
bias and patient care.  See, e.g., Elizabeth D. Cox, Kirstin A. Nackers, Henry N. Young, Megan 
A. Moreno, Joseph F. Levy & Rita M. Mangione-Smith Influence of Race and Socioeconomic 
Status on Engagement in Pediatric Primary Care, 87 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 319, 
320–23 (2012) (using RIAS to examine differences in communication between pediatric 
primary care providers and patients based on race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status); 
Kimberly A. Gudzune, Mary Catherine Beach, Debra L. Roter & Lisa A. Cooper, Physicians 
Build Less Rapport with Obese Patients, 21 OBESITY 2146, 2147–49 (2013) (using RIAS to 
show that primary care providers developed less rapport with overweight and obese patients 
than with patients of a normal weight). 
69  VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 3, at 89 (describing the process of voir dire). 
70  B. Mitchell Peck & Meredith Denney, Disparities in the Conduct of the Medical 
Encounter, 2 SAGE OPEN 1, 2 (2012); 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 181 (2017) (noting trial court’s 
role in supervising the content and structure of voir dire and discretion in limiting topics of 
discussion). 
71  Compare Peck & Denney, supra note 70, at 1 (discussing the three functions of the 
medical interview: data gathering, communicating information, and relationship building), 
with JAMES J. GOBERT, ELLEN KREITZBERG ROSE III, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART AND 
SCIENCE OF SELECTING A JURY, at § 10:2 (2013–14):  
The legal rationale for voir dire is two-fold: 1) to provide the court and counsel with the 
information needed to remove for cause jurors who cannot be fair and impartial; and 2) to provide 
counsel with information that allows the exercise of peremptory challenges in an informed and 
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Researchers involved in the Arizona Jury Study Project used a similar 
type of analysis to code the conversations of jurors during their 
deliberations.72  Diamond and colleagues coded the conversations that 
occurred among jurors as they decided verdicts using video recordings of 
their deliberations in actual trials to test the effect of proposed reforms.  
Through detailed coding of the content and process of the deliberations, they 
were able to examine factors such as relative frequency and length of each 
juror’s participation in the conversation, as well as the specific topics 
discussed. 
The jury selection process is likewise amenable to the kind of rigor and 
thoroughness the researchers involved in the Arizona Jury Study brought to 
coding the process of jury deliberations.  In the next part, we explain how we 
adapted the RIAS method to examine how prosecutors talk to potential jurors 
in selecting juries for North Carolina capital cases. 
III. THE CURRENT STUDY 
This study analyzes the process of voir dire in twelve capital murder 
cases in North Carolina.  Section III.A explains the purposive sampling 
scheme and the theoretical reasons for this approach, and provides details of 
execution.  Section III.B documents the coding process. 
A.  SAMPLE DESIGN 
We selected cases for inclusion in several stages.  First, we identified 
thirty-four cases from the 173 North Carolina capital cases included in our 
prior study where the court had granted a motion for individual voir dire.73 In 
these thirty-four cases, the attorneys and judge questioned each juror 
separately rather than in a group.  Focusing on these cases allowed us to 
identify clearly the part of the transcript that is relevant to each targeted juror.  
Second, we identified the county of prosecution for each case.  The thirty-
four cases with individual voir dire came from twenty-five different counties. 
 
intelligent manner. To ensure that voir dire is effective, counsel should try to elicit as much 
relevant information as possible from the jurors. Only then is counsel in a position to determine 
which jurors should be challenged.  Voir dire also provides a lawyer the opportunity to inform 
jurors about the facts, set out the client’s theory of the case, and explain relevant legal principles 
 and id. at § 10:1 (“It also provides a lawyer a few moments to get to know the jurors, to 
establish a degree of rapport, and to tell them about the case they will be hearing.”). 
72   Shari Seidman Diamond, Neil Vidmar, Mary Rose & Leslie Ellis, Juror Discussions 
During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
73  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214(j) (2009) (“In capital cases the trial judge for good cause 
shown may direct that jurors be selected one at a time, in which case each juror must first be 
passed by the State. These jurors may be sequestered before and after selection.”). 
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Our next step was to draw a stratified sample of twelve cases from this 
list that achieved balance in defendant/victim racial combinations, and 
diversity of both place and trial participants.  To achieve this we sorted the 
cases into the following defendant-victim categories: white defendant/white 
victim, black defendant/white victim, and black defendant/black victim.74 We 
then used SPSS to randomly select four cases from each category.75  We 
further stratified so that each case was from a different county, and that none 
of the attorneys or judges was involved in more than one case. 
In prior research, we examined attorneys’ strike decisions.76  In these 
twelve cases, prosecutors struck 50.7% of black jurors versus 21.2% of all 
other jurors, a ratio of 2.4.77  In contrast, defense attorneys struck 27.6% of 
black jurors versus 56.8% of all other jurors, a ratio of 0.49.78 
Here, we shift our attention from the ultimate strike decisions to the 
process of making that decision by examining the conversation leading up to 
the decision to strike or pass a potential juror.  That is, we are interested in 
the actual conversation between each targeted juror and the judge, prosecutor, 
and defense counsel trying the case.  We therefore selected from the twelve 
cases in our sample only those potential jurors with particular characteristics 
most likely to elicit questioning.  Specifically, we targeted jurors who had  
(1) expressed reservations about the death penalty, (2) previously been 
accused of a crime, (3) indicated that they or a close relative worked for law 
enforcement or a prosecutor’s office, or (4) expressed concern that jury 
service would impose undue hardship.  We targeted these jurors because 
these four characteristics strongly predicted prosecutorial peremptory strikes 
in our previous research, and they relate to common stereotypes about how 
racial groups differ as jurors.79 
1. Death Penalty Reservations Subset 
Prosecutors frequently argue that race disparities in the exercise of 
peremptory strikes arise because black citizens are more likely to oppose the 
 
74  There were not enough cases involving white defendants and black victims to include 
this category. 
75  In one instance, the selected case had only one black juror.  We eliminated this case 
and used SPSS to randomly select a new case. 
76   See, e.g.,  Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2. 
77   This difference is statistically significant at p < .001. 
78   This difference is statistically significant at p < .001. 
79   See Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1556, tbl. 5 (presenting a fully-controlled 
logistic regression model in which these factors are significant predictors of prosecutorial 
strike decisions). 
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death penalty.80 While there is empirical support for that generalization,81 
controlling for that factor did not substantially mitigate the race disparities in 
the RJA Study.82 
We found that while the expression of death penalty reservations greatly 
increased the odds that a prosecutor would strike potential jurors of any race 
(odds ratio = 11.44), black jurors with that characteristic were still 
significantly more likely to be struck than a non-black counterpart expressing 
similar views.83  Among people who expressed hesitation about the death 
penalty, the prosecution passed (that is, declined to strike) disproportionately 
more white potential jurors (26.4% non-black jurors with death penalty 
reservations passed) than black potential jurors with such reservations 
(9.7%).84 
Potential jurors in the cases we analyzed expressed reservations about 
imposing the death penalty often enough to allow us to examine the dynamics 
surrounding questioning about this factor in relation to race and outcome. 
Eleven percent of the strike-eligible venire members in the statewide sample 
we analyzed expressed some reservation about imposing the death penalty; 
about one-third of those jurors were black. 
2. Prior Criminal Accusation 
Another explanation frequently offered for racial disparities is that black 
potential jurors are more likely to have been accused of a crime.85  Those 
 
80  Baldus et al., supra note 1, at 41 n.133; Transcript of Closing Argument, supra note 10, 
at 2590–92. 
81   John K. Cochran & Mitchell B. Chamlin, The Enduring Racial Divide in Death Penalty 
Support, 34 J. CRIM. JUST.  85, 85 (2006); Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due 
Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 
46 (1984); James D. Unnever & Francis T. Cullen, Reassessing the Racial Divide in Support 
for Capital Punishment the Continuing Significance Of Race, 44 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 
125 (2007); James D. Unnever & Francis T. Cullen, The Racial Divide in Support for the 
Death Penalty: Does White Racism Matter?, 85 SOC. FORCES 1281, 1281 (2007).  
82   See Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1554–55, 1556, tbl. 5. 
83   Id. at 1556, tbl. 5. 
84  Id. This difference is statistically significant at p < .001. 
85  See Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 8, at 1096–97 (reviewing commonly proffered reasons 
for peremptory strikes and noting the frequency with which prior experience with the criminal 
justice system was accepted as a race-neutral reason notwithstanding its disproportionate 
impact on specific racial and ethnic groups); Gilad Edelman, Why Is It So Easy for Prosecutors 
to Strike Black Jurors?, THE NEW YORKER (June 5, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-is-it-so-easy-for-prosecutors-to-strike-
black-jurors (arguing that “race is an unfortunate but powerful generalization” because “black 
people are more likely to have been targeted or abused by police” and “to be affected by the 
extreme racial disparities in arrests, incarceration, and the death penalty”).  
O’BRIEN ET AL. 10/10/17  5:44 PM 
704 O’BRIEN, GROSSO & TAYLOR [Vol. 107 
 
with such experience might be less trusting of police and prosecutors, and 
thus be more skeptical of the state’s evidence.86  Indeed, in the statewide 
sample, people who had been accused of crimes were more likely to be struck 
by the prosecution (odds ratio = 2.1), but even after controlling for this factor, 
a pronounced racial disparity persisted (being black increased the odds of 
being struck by 2.5).87  Prosecutors were less inclined to strike non-black 
jurors with this characteristic (63.8% passed) compared to their black 
counterparts (36.7% passed).88 
As with death penalty reservations, this characteristic appears frequently 
enough in the data to meaningfully examine the dynamics surrounding 
questioning about this factor in relation to race and outcome.  Ten percent of 
strike-eligible jurors in the statewide sample had this characteristic; just over 
one quarter of those jurors were black. 
3. Hardship Arising from Jury Service 
A potential juror who expressed concern that jury service would pose an 
undue burden was significantly more likely to be struck by the state (odds 
ratio = 3.0).89  This characteristic is also proffered to account for racial 
disparities (that is, that due to pre-existing socio-economic inequalities, black 
potential jurors were more likely to face hardship through jury service).  But 
again, race remained a significant predictor of prosecutorial strikes even 
when controlling for this factor.  Within this category of people sharing this 
characteristic the prosecution passed disproportionally more non-black 
potential jurors (26.4%) than black potential jurors (9.7%).  Of jurors in the 
statewide sample, 4.4% had this characteristic, of whom about 15.7% were 
black. 
4. Employment with Police or Prosecutors 
The first three characteristics discussed increased the odds of a state 
strike, but examining the questioning of jurors with characteristics that 
decrease those odds may also prove valuable.  One such characteristic is 
employment with police or a prosecutor’s office.  Prosecutors were much less 
 
86  See generally Vida B. Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest 
Records Violates Batson, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387 (2016) (reviewing the practices of 
striking jurors based on arrest record and concluding that doing so violates Batson). 
87  Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1556, tbl. 5. This variable does not include close 
relatives of the jurors who were accused of a crime.  Both this variable and the broader variable 
predict state strikes, but the broader variable would target too many jurors for this project. 
88  Data on file with authors. 
89   Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1556, tbl. 5. 
O’BRIEN 10/10/17  5:44 PM 
2017] EXAMINING JURORS 705 
 
likely to strike a juror who personally had worked with police or prosecutors, 
or who had a close friend or family member who had done so (odds ratio = 
.63).  In the statewide sample, 18% of jurors had this characteristic; 11% of 
those jurors were black. 
All four characteristics discussed above—death penalty reservations, 
prior criminal accusation, hardship, and employment with police or 
prosecutors—are not only strong predictors of prosecutorial strike decisions, 
but also appear important to defense counsel.  Although we have yet to 
construct a fully-controlled model of defense strikes, preliminary analysis 
suggests that many of the same factors are at work, but (not surprisingly) in 
the opposite direction. For instance, one preliminary model shows that 
defense counsel were significantly less likely to strike a juror who expressed 
ambivalence about the death penalty (odds ratio = .43). The same pattern 
emerged for jurors who have personally been accused of a crime, or who had 
a close friend or family member so accused (odds ratio = .62). In contrast, 
defense counsel are significantly more likely to strike a juror who had worked 
with the police or prosecutors (odds ratio = 4.37).  Hardship is the only 
characteristic of the four that increases the odds of both defense and state 
strikes (odds ratio = 1.6 (defense), 3.0 (state)).  Thus, given the importance 
of these factors to strike decisions, conversations with jurors who have these 
characteristics may provide a window into the decision-making processes of 
the parties. 
B.  CONVERSATION CODING 
This study focuses on the substance of voir dire itself in order to 
document disparities in the questioning process rather than solely in the 
particular content of questions and answers.  Our unit of analysis is an 
utterance—the smallest part of expression that can be meaningfully coded.90  
Utterances are coded for both form and substance.  For example, as illustrated 
below and in Appendix 1, we distinguish closed from open-ended questions.  
Coding categories are both exhaustive and mutually exclusive, which allow 
them to function either on their own or as components of other variables.  
Separate codes document personal and historical information, as well as 
length of voir dire, verbal dominance (who speaks most), and the extent of 
individual expression.91  Codes are informed both by prior voir dire analysis 
and experimental work on stereotypes and information seeking, as well as 
 
90  Roter & Larson, supra note 17, at 35. 
91  Id. 
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literature on conversation analysis.92 
1. Adapting the RIAS Rubric to Legal Analysis 
The first task involved adapting the RIAS coding rubric to the legal 
context.  The adaptation was often straightforward; in both the medical and 
legal contexts, the parties seek and give information and instructions, make 
small talk, and express concerns.  For instance, a doctor explaining the next 
steps in the patient’s treatment plan is analogous to a judge explaining how 
the trial will unfold. 
There are, however, obvious differences between the two settings.  The 
lawyers are working as adversaries and are bound by court rules that govern 
both what they say and how they say it.  We therefore worked closely with 
Debra Roter and Susan Larson to determine which medical RIAS codes could 
be applied to voir dire conversations without modification, which were 
applicable with some modification, and which were simply too specific to the 
medical setting to be useful.93  Along those lines, we created codes to capture 
aspects of conversation unique to the legal setting, such as arguments about 
Batson objections, as well as aspects of the conversation that have special 
significance in voir dire, such as assertions of fact versus opinions. 
2. Coding & Reliability 
The adapted RIAS coding scheme included forty-six mutually exclusive 
codes for utterances.94  To code the voir dire transcripts using this system, we 
 
92  See infra Appendix 1 for a complete list of text codes. 
93  For instance, RIAS includes specific codes for biomedical information giving and 
counseling, distinct from psychosocial information giving and counseling.  The former 
involves information specific to the patient’s condition and treatment plan, and the latter 
involves broader information about lifestyle.  Those precise codes would not apply in the voir 
dire setting, but there are other distinctions that are relevant, such as information about the 
specific case being tried versus the law more generally. 
94  See infra Appendix 1.  See, e.g., Lisa A. Cooper, Debra L. Roter, Kathryn A. Carson, 
Mary Catherine Beach, Janice A. Sabin, Anthony G. Greenwald & Thomas S. Inui, The 
Associations of Clinicians’ Implicit Attitudes about Race with Medical Visit Communication 
and Patient Ratings of Interpersonal Care, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 979, 980 (2012) (“This 
system assigns each thought the patient and clinician express to mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive codes that can be combined to reflect categories of exchange, including functions 
of the medical interview.”); Differences in Patient-Provider Communication, supra note 66, 
at 683:  
RIAS analysts assign one of 37 mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories to each complete 
thought expressed by either the patient or provider (referred to as an utterance). These categories 
can be combined to reflect four broad types of exchange . . . : socio-emotional communication 
(including emotional talk, positive talk, negative talk, and social chit-chat), information-giving 
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hired law student graduate research assistants with an eighteen month 
commitment and invested in extensive training in RIAS coding.95  The 
coders, blind to our hypothesis,96 were assigned individual target jurors to 
code.  Coders began by reviewing an entire voir dire transcript to evaluate 
every conversation in which a target juror appears.  Conversations with the 
target juror were easily identified and separated from other conversations 
because these cases all involved individual voir dire.  Once the coder 
identified every conversation, the coder coded every part of the transcript 
relevant to this juror. 
Before undertaking coding, every coder completed a multi-day training, 
a day-and-a-half of which was taught by an expert in RIAS.  We required that 
all coding be done by two independent coders until each coder had achieved 
reliability and consistency, and held weekly oral reviews to correct mistakes 
and to review difficult transcript sections. We also maintained the RIAS 
Legal Codebook containing a detailed explanation of each code and examples 
of its proper application.  Coders had to review this codebook weekly and to 
make precise reference to it when raising questions with the project manager. 
Coders worked on site under the close supervision of the project manager. 
As coding improved, we developed a systematic “spot check” on coding 
accuracy.  We asked each current member of the team to code several pages 
of transcript in preparation for the weekly coding meeting.  We ran “spot 
check” exercises approximately six times over three months.  We then 
reviewed the transcript pages together at the meeting, correcting coding, and 
providing guidance to improve coding precision. 
Finally, we randomly selected twelve juror transcripts for double 
coding.  This is about 1.5% of the jurors in the study (12/792).  This review 
analyzed 9,299 lines of code pertaining to approximately 5,870 coding 
decisions.  We found substantial agreement, with a kappa of .78. 
 
 
(including biomedical and psychosocial/lifestyle information and counseling), question-asking 
(including biomedical and psychosocial/lifestyle questions), and patient activation (such as asking 
for the others’ opinions, confirming the others’ understanding, or clarifying one’s own 
understanding. 
95  We hired separate coders to complete the descriptive information, strike decisions, and 
removals for cause to identify all targeted jurors in the study. 
96  Coders were typically blind to race, as well, except for a few instances when race was 
explicitly mentioned by one of the parties in the transcript.  We decided against redacting that 
information as doing so would have drawn attention to the issue of race and might have alerted 
the coders that we were interested in racial disparities. 
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3. Global Affect Rating 
Coding of utterances is a fine, micro-level look at the interactions among 
the parties in voir dire.  To assess the more general tenor of the exchanges, 
coders also rated the tone of the exchanges more globally.  After each section 
of the transcript (that is, when the court handed off the questioning to the 
prosecutor, and then to the defense), coders completed a Global Affect 
Ratings Code Sheet to note their perceptions of various affective dimensions 
of the exchange, such as the parties’ warmth, frustration, nervousness, and 
level of engagement.  In contrast to the relatively strict rubric of the RIAS 
coding explained above, the global affect reports are necessarily subjective.  
They capture the coders’ opinions about the tone of the conversation.  
Moreover, the use of transcripts instead of videotaped exchanges naturally 
limits the ability of the coders to gauge the tone of the exchange.  
Nevertheless, transcribed conversations often convey feelings of irritation, 
friendliness, and boredom, among others, through cues such as clipped 
answers, interruptions, and phrasing. 
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DATA 
Section IV.A describes the study sample and compares it to the universe 
of jurors from which we drew the sample.  Section IV.B introduces some 
dimensions of the database by demonstrating ways the data can be used to 
understand the voir dire process. 
A. THE STUDY SAMPLE 
Our study includes 792 potential jurors across twelve cases.  As noted 
in Part III.A above, we did not include the whole venire for these cases.  
Rather, we drew a purposive sample in which all the potential jurors in our 
study fell into at least one of four target groups: (1) potential jurors with death 
penalty reservations (46.0%, 365/792), (2) those who had been accused of a 
crime (8.3%, 66/792), (3) those who had connections to police or a 
prosecutor’s office (18.6%, 147/792), and (4) those who expressed concern 
that jury service would impose a hardship (42.9%, 340/792).97  Table 1, 
Column B shows the total venire of the twelve cases, and Columns C–F show 
the number of potential jurors in each relevant category that constituted our 
sample. 
Our prior research focused on strike decisions.98 In this study, we 
 
97  The percentages do not add up to 100% because some potential jurors had more than 
one of the targeted characteristics and thus fell into more than one target group. 
98  Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1533 (explaining the scope of the research). 
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expand the analysis to include removals for cause, which is how most 
potential jurors in these cases exited the path to serving on a jury, as shown 
in Table 2, Column D.  Table 2 shows the outcome (seated, struck, or excused 
for cause) for the 792 potential jurors included in the study by each of the 
twelve cases. 
TABLE 1.  STUDY SAMPLE BY TARGET GROUP AND CASE 
 
A B C D E F G 
















14.0 67 11 2 16 12 33 
41.0 138 64 9 18 25 88 
88.2 107 23 5 37 14 73 
103.0 65 17 8 13 10 37 
190.0 275 72 13 106 33 194 
220.1 141 27 10 58 13 93 
256.0 90 20 6 15 15 48 
294.0 70 24 1 14 3 38 
319.0 103 19 1 33 8 57 
327.0 118 51 6 7 5 65 
330.0 74 24 4 7 8 37 
363.0 57 15 2 16 3 29 
Total 1305 367 67 340 149 792 
	  
TABLE 2.  STUDY SAMPLE BY JURY SELECTION OUTCOME AND CASE 
 
A B C D E F 






14.0 6 5 19 3 33 
41.0 9 6 69 4 88 
88.2 8 8 48 9 73 
103.0 8 6 16 7 37 
190.0 13 6 169 6 194 
 
99  Column G includes all of the jurors in columns C–F but is not the sum of columns C–
F. A juror may fall into more than one target group (presented in columns C–F), but ultimately 
appears only once in the study sample (presented in column G). 
100  This column includes venire members selected as alternates. 
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220.1 11 6 72 3 93 
256.0 5 7 32 6 48 
294.0 6 3 26 3 38 
319.0 7 4 43 3 57 
327.0 7 3 51 5 65 
330.0 10 3 20 4 37 
363.0 6 2 18 3 29 
Totals 96 59 583 56 792 
 
Of these potential jurors, 63.5% were white (503/792), 28.5% were 
black (226/792), 1.3% were Native American (10/792), 0.3% were Asian 
(2/792), 0.1% were Latino (1/792). We are missing race information for 6.3% 
(50/792).  Women made up 58.3% of the potential jurors (462/792), and men 
were 41.7% (330/792).  Table 3 shows the outcome for the potential jurors 
in the study by race; the racially-disparate strike patterns roughly mirror the 
patterns for the full population of venire members in these twelve cases. 
TABLE 3.  STUDY SAMPLE BY RATE OF STRIKE 
AND CAUSE REMOVALS, BY RACE 
 State Strikes Defense Strikes Cause Challenges 
 Passed Struck Passed Struck Passed Excused 












































We coded every utterance exchanged by judges, prosecutors, defense 
counsel, and other court officials with the 792 potential jurors for a total of 
193,869 utterances. As noted above, we selected these jurors for inclusion 
because their particular characteristics were most likely to elicit focused 
questioning.  Every utterance captures a complete thought, but can vary 
greatly in length from a one-word response to multiple lines of text 
expressing a single thought.  Table 4 therefore sets forth not only the average 
number of utterances by each potential juror per case (Column C), but also 
the average number of characters of text for each (Column D), which 
provides a sense of the amount of talk. 
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TABLE 4.  STUDY SAMPLE BY AVERAGE NUMBER OF UTTERANCES AND 
AMOUNT OF SPEECH PER JUROR BY CASE 
A B C D 
Case Jurors Average # of Utterances per Juror 
Average # of Characters 
of Speech per Juror 
14.0 33 246 459,395 
41.0 88 432 799,806 
88.2 73 232 431,777 
103.0 37 256 478,394 
190.0 194 192 351,563 
220.1 93 181 343,197 
256.0 48 395 743,462 
294.0 38 208 394,354 
319.0 57 198 275,690 
327.0 65 166 309,712 
330.0 37 338 626,512 
363.0 29 200 379,400 
Total 792 245 466,105 
 
This study was based on a purposive sample.  Sample details provide 
critical foundation for future work.  Section IV.A presented details about the 
study sample in five domains.  First it presented the purposive distribution of 
jurors among cases and target groups.  It then documented jury selection 
outcomes and strike and cause removals rates by race and compared the 
sample to the universe in this respect.  Finally, it documented the scope of 
conversation codes and variance in rate of conversation by case.  The next 
section shifts attention to the coding scheme. 
B. CAPACITIES OF THE CODING SCHEME 
While the previous section presented basic information about the study 
sample, this section provides details about the capacities of coding scheme. 
The first subsection presents analysis using qualities of speech, such as 
whether a question is open or closed.  Next we consider ways of evaluating 
speech in the aggregate to compare the amount different speakers speak or 
the ratio between subsets of speakers.  This can help evaluate dominance or 
variance in treatment.  The final subsection demonstrates how conversation 
profiles can be used to identify cases for qualitative work.  Previous research 
on jury selection and charging and sentencing decisions in these cases 
provide rich data to complement these analyses.101 
 
101  See generally Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2; Barbara O’Brien, Catherine M. Grosso, 
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1. Qualities of Speech 
Coding tags qualities of speech as well as content.  Table 5 provides a 
simple example of this.  The table starts in the least exciting part of the coding 
scheme.  Basic compound codes mark interactions with very little emotional 
content.  Basic codes note whether questions are open or closed, whether they 
seek or give fact or opinion, and whether they focus on general legal matters, 
case specific matters, personal legal matters, or personal matters. 
More than 60% of the utterances in the databases are marked with basic 
compound codes.  For example, if a prosecutor asks a juror, “Do you go to 
church?”  This would be coded as a “Closed Personal Question.”  The 
response, “Yes,” would be coded as “Gives Personal Information.”  Slightly 
different codes focus on the content of speech—general legal, case specific, 
personal, or personal legal—in these compound codes.  A second set of codes 
capture affect more precisely.  Imagine the prosecutor prefaced the previous 
question with some apologetic language, saying instead, “Please don’t think 
I am prying into your personal life, but do you go to church?”  The first phrase 
would be coded separately, noting the reassuring tone, 
“Reassures/Optimism” and the second as a Closed Personal Question. 
Table 5 presents basic counts of utterances by only one aspect of general 
compound code—the fact of asking an open or closed question.  It 
disaggregates this information by voir dire section.  Coders identified 
sections as they coded; sections follow a pattern.  Typically individualized 
voir dire begins with the judge explaining the process and the case to a 
potential juror.  This is the court section.  The prosecution follows and holds 
the floor while he questions the juror.  Finally, the defense counsel takes over 
voir dire if the prosecutor is satisfied and passes the juror.102 
You can see in Column 3 that generally speaking, most general code 
question utterances were made during the prosecutor’s part of voir dire.  This 
section accounts for 61% of the utterances (23,578/38,854).  Defense 
counsel, on the other hand, goes last and speaks less.  Only 22% of the 
utterances were made by defense counsel (6,773/38,854).  This pattern holds 
across open and closed questions, shown in Columns B and C. 
Comparing Columns B and C shows the dominance of closed questions 
in voir dire.  Ninety-four percent of these questions are closed, a pattern that 
holds throughout voir dire.  The overwhelming dominance of closed 
questions in a context in which the speaker intends to learn about qualified 
 
George Woodworth & Abijah Taylor, Untangling the Role of Race in Capital Charging and 
Sentencing in North Carolina, 1990–2009, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1997 (2016). 
102  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214 (2009) (defining jury selection procedures). 
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jurors raises general questions about the utility of voir dire.  Future research 
may evaluate the evidence presented here about how voir dire actually 
unfolded in these cases to test the use of best practices in this kind of 
questioning. 
TABLE 5.  PRESENCE OF OPEN AND CLOSED QUESTION CODES BY 
 VOIR DIRE SECTION ACROSS ALL CASES 
 
 A B C 
  Open Questions Closed Questions 
  n % n % 
1. Court 336 15% 6,437 18% 
2. Defense 597 27% 7,906 22% 
3. Prosecutor 1,259 57% 22,319 61% 
4. Totals 2,192  36,662  
  6%  94%  
 
More specific codes document behavior with a higher level of emotional 
content.  For example, coders watch for a special kind of narrowly defined 
leading questions.  These codes mark information where the speaker 
introduces new information to the juror that would either increase or decrease 
the juror’s likelihood of qualifying for the jury.  Leading questions often 
address the venire members’ opinions about the death penalty.  Other codes 
document each time a speaker asks for reassurance or ask for understanding.  
Analysis of patterns of speech around expressions of empathy or situations 
in which an attorney discloses something about himself to the juror (“I play 
golf there too”) may tag areas that merit close analysis of the ways 
stereotypes influence voir dire speech and limit its value. 
2. Moving Beyond Individual Variables to  
Look at Patterns or Systemic Variation 
The coding system also tracked the amount and order of speech to allow 
us to look beyond individual codes at patterns or systems.  Previous scholars 
have used this capacity to document the amount of talk by speaker or the ratio 
of one kind of speech to another.103 In subsequent work we could also use 
 
103  See, e.g., Roter & Larson, supra note 17, at 37 (citing studies where these approaches 
have been taken). 
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this capacity to analyze the polarity or subjectivity of the language in an effort 
to capture emotive content in the highly ritualized context of voir dire.104  Our 
data allows us to analyze the amount of talk by each speaker, the sequences 
of speech within and between speakers and respondents, and the nature of the 
speech. 
Calculations of the ratio of talk between medical providers and patients 
have been used as an indication of verbal dominance.105  We adapted that 
measure here to evaluate the relationship between different speakers and 
jurors.  Table 6 presents this information for each of the twelve cases in our 
study.  Each section shows the ratio of the amount of prosecutor, defense 
attorney, and judge talk to juror talk for black and other jurors.  These 
calculations are based on a sum of the number of characters used in the voir 
transcript during every utterance by each speaker.  We also disaggregated the 
data and ratios by gender, but did not see meaningful differences in this level 
of analysis.  Subsequent work may look more closely at the intersection 
between race and gender with respect to verbal dominance. 
These ratios presented in Table 6 suggest that the extent of verbal 
dominance varies by race (black or other) and actor (judge, prosecutor, or 
defense counsel).  Looking first at prosecutor speech, the average ratio 
between prosecutor speech and juror speech (prosecutor/juror) is 0.92.  This 
number averages the ratios for prosecutor/juror speech for all jurors in 
Column B.  Columns C and D present the ratio in amount of speech 
disaggregated by race.  Column C presents speech ratios for black jurors and 
Column D presents ratios for all other jurors.  Columns E and F compare the 
information in Columns D and E.  Column E reports the arithmetic difference 
between them (Column C–Column D).  Column F presents the ratio between 
the columns (Column C/Column D).  These measures provide two estimates 
of the magnitude of any disparity observed. 
Looking first at Column C, in eight of twelve cases the prosecutor 
dominates the juror by between 0.20 and 1.5 points more when the juror is 
black than when the juror is any other race.  The ratio between them varies 
from 1.27 and 3.14 across these eight cases.  In two cases, the ratio does not 
differ meaningfully by race.  In the final two, the ratio flips in the other 
direction. These two cases are the oldest cases in the study and both involve 
black defendants and white victims. 
 
104  See generally Douglas R. Rice & Christopher Zorn, Corpus-Based Dictionaries for 
Sentiment Analysis of Specialized Vocabularies, Presentation at the New Directions in 
Analyzing Text as Data Workshop: September 27–28, 2013 (Sept. 19, 2013) (preliminary 
draft). 
105  Roter & Larson, supra note 17, at 37. 
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Turning to defense counsel speech, it is noteworthy that the defense 
follows the prosecution in capital voir dire in North Carolina and, therefore, 
is unlikely to have spoken with any juror that faced a state strike.106  As a 
result, defense counsel has less speech overall in the dataset.  The average 
ratio between defense counsel speech and juror speech (defense/juror) is 
0.46.  Previous research comparing prosecutor and defense decision-making 
in jury selection found that defense counsel struck a higher percent of non-
black jurors than black jurors and, in fact, seemed to operate as the mirror 
opposite of prosecutors.107  The mirroring effect is present in ratios in Table 
6.  The ratio of defense to juror speech with jurors of other races exceeds the 
ratio for black jurors in ten of twelve cases.  The difference in ratios ranges 
from -0.12 to -0.80 (Column E).  The ratio goes from infinity (0.57/0) to .06.  
The ratios in two cases move in the opposite direction (319 and 330).  One 
of these is a case in which the prosecutor also switched directions. 
TABLE 6.  PROSECUTOR/JUROR, DEFENSE/JUROR, AND JUDGE/JUROR 
SPEECH RATIOS BY CASE, OVERALL (COL. B)  
AND BY RACE (COLS. C-F)108 
A B C D E F 







14 Badgett (n = 33) (n = 2) (n = 31)   
Prosecutor/Juror 0.63 1.59 0.57 1.02 2.79 
Defense/Juror 0.53 0 0.57 -0.57 0.00 
Judge/Juror 0.95 0.92 0.96 -0.04 0.96 
41 Braxton (n = 88) (n = 48) (n = 40)   
Prosecutor/Juror 1.11 1.09 1.13 -0.04 0.96 
Defense/Juror 0.50 0.39 0.59 -0.2 0.66 
Judge/Juror 0.43 0.53 0.34 0.19 1.56 
88.2 Duke (n = 73) (n = 6) (n = 53)   
Prosecutor/Juror 0.73 1.05 0.72 0.33 1.46 
Defense/Juror 0.56 0.55 0.58 -0.03 0.95 
Judge/Juror 0.51 0.41 0.47 -0.06 0.87 
 
106  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214 (defining jury selection procedures). 
107  David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan Weiner & Barbara 
Broffitt, The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical 
Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 51–55 (2001). 
108  Not all columns sum because of missing race information. 
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A B C D E F 







































Defense/Juror 0.59 0.28 0.71 -0.43 0.39 
Judge/Juror 0.32 0.36 0.31 0.05 1.16 
220.1 Al-
Bayyinah (n = 93) (n = 8) (n = 85)   
Prosecutor/Juror 0.81 1.01 0.77 0.24 1.31 
Defense/Juror 0.30 0.20 0.33 -0.13 0.61 
Judge/Juror 1.10 0.91 1.13 -0.22 0.81 
256 Richardson (n = 48) (n = 15) (n = 33)   
Prosecutor/Juror 0.70 2.20 0.70 1.5 3.14 
Defense/Juror 0.55 0.35 0.49 -0.14 0.71 
Judge/Juror 0.99 1.60 0.88 0.72 1.82 
294 Stroud (n = 38) (n = 14) (n =23)   
Prosecutor/Juror 0.86 0.88 0.85 0.03 1.04 
Defense/Juror 0.47 0.36 0.54 -0.18 0.67 
Judge/Juror 0.71 0.74 0.68 0.06 1.09 
319 Warren (n = 57) (n = 4) (n = 45)   
Prosecutor/Juror 0.76 0.93 0.73 0.2 1.27 
Defense/Juror 0.39 0.47 0.41 0.06 1.15 
Judge/Juror 0.66 0.78 0.62 0.16 1.26 
327 Williams (n = 65) (n = 45) (n = 20)   
Prosecutor/Juror 1.02 1.10 0.85 0.25 1.29 
Defense/Juror 0.26 0.20 0.39 -0.19 0.51 
Judge/Juror 0.62 0.65 0.54 0.11 1.20 
330 Williams (n = 37) (n = 22) (n = 14)   
Prosecutor/Juror 0.85 0.68 0.90 -0.22 0.76 
Defense/Juror 0.45 0.54 0.42 0.12 1.29 
Judge/Juror 0.42 0.77 0.32 0.45 2.41 
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A B C D E F 


























Judge/Juror 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.2 1.83 
 
Table 6 also reports ratios with respect to judge speech.  The average 
ratio between judicial speech and juror speech is 0.64.  This analysis excludes 
any sections where the judge is speaking to a large group of jurors 
collectively.  The judge speech ratio is higher in voir with black jurors in 
eight of twelve cases.  It flips in the other direction for two and is equal in 
two. 
The disparities reported here provide a first look at the way the speakers 
interacted with each other with respect to holding the floor.  Future work will 
allow us to look more carefully at how these disparities appear in different 
target groups or in the context of different parts of voir dire conversations. 
3. Working with Single Cases, In Depth 
This research ultimately seeks to document ways that the voir dire 
process itself might contribute to the improper influence of race.  While the 
data is poised for analysis, the next phase requires identifying patterns of 
codes that would help to identify areas where information seeking behavior 
may present.  We need to hypothesize about what the codes might look like 
in these situations.  Precisely, we need queries that we can operationalize and 
test. 
The RIAS coding system lends itself to this part of the process well.  By 
coding utterances individually, that is coding every complete thought 
separately, and by making the codes “mutually exclusive and exhaustive,” 
the codes work well as “building blocks” that we can combine “to summarize 
the dialogue” with respect to content, tone, or even sequence.109 
This subsection presents one example of this kind of work.  The analysis 
here relied on conversation profiles that we built by grouping individual 
codes around function and, to some extent, tone.  The profile has four 
mutually exclusive components.  Use of similar categories in previous RIAS 
coded studies provided guidance in defining meaningful components.110  
 
109  Roter & Larson, supra note 17, at 37. 
110  See Debra L. Roter , Moira Stewart, Samuel M. Putnam, Mack Lipkin, William Stiles 
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Education/orientation speech, the first, includes utterances that provide facts 
and information about the law and the case at hand.  Data gathering speech, 
the second, includes questions about facts and opinions relevant to the 
proceedings.  Relationship building speech, the third, involves utterances in 
which the speaker reaches out to the juror with expressions such as empathy 
or approval, self-disclosure, or reassurances.  Finally, the fourth, conflict 
speech arises when there is disagreement, criticism, or leading questions that 
seem designed to control the juror’s response. 
We assigned each individual code to a single component by polling our 
coders.  Our coders had read and coded hundreds of pages of transcripts 
before we asked them to do this project.  They had developed nuanced 
understandings of the codes and the transcripts.  Coders assigned each code 
to one of the four pre-defined mutually exclusive categories.  We then 
combined their results into a “conversation profile” with four distinct 
components: education/orientation speech, data gathering speech, 
relationship building speech, and conflict speech.  This profile can be refined 
to reflect different speakers and contexts.111 
The profile describes what percent of the speech in each case falls in 
each component.  For example, in the case of John Badgett (14.0), 53% of 
speech was spent on education and orientation, 26% on data gathering, 11% 
on relationship building, and 12% on conflict.  Contrast this with the overall 
conversation profile in the case of Lesley E. Warren (319.0) where 63% of 
the speech was spent on education and orientation, 28% on data gathering, 
only 4% on relationship building, and 5% on conflict.  Comparing different 
profiles suggests variance the tone of voir dire and perhaps the strategy or 
technique of the attorneys. 
We also analyzed communication profiles disaggregated by strike 
decision (strike versus pass) or by race (black versus white).  Figure 1 
presents the voir dire conversation profile in John Badgett’s case 
disaggregated by race.  Each component of the conversation profile appears 
in a set of bar graphs.  The dark grey bar on the left represents black venire 
members.  The light grey bar on the right represents all other venire members.  
Black venire members in this case face less education and orientation, but 
 
& Thomas S. Inui,  Communication Patterns of Primary Care Physicians, 277 J. AM. MED.  
ASS’N  350, 351 (1997) (explaining the summary groupings of RIAS codes in a study 
analyzing doctor-patient communication as including question-asking, biomedical 
information giving, psychosocial exchanges, positive talk, negative talk, social talk, 
facilitation, and orientation). 
111  See infra Appendix 2 for a definition of the codes included in each category.  Note 
that this profile assumed a prosecutor as speaker.  Subsequent work will prepare profiles by 
speaker. 
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more data gathering.  They participate in fewer utterances that build 
relationships and more that reflect conflict. 
 Similar patterns appear in some of the other cases as well.  Without 
more, however, it is difficult to know how to interpret these differences.  The 
next step is to analyze the underlying codes to see if disparate patterns of 
questioning underlie the disparate levels of conflict or relationship building 
profiles.  Complementary research on jury selection and charging and 
sentencing decisions in each case in the study and in North Carolina during 
the time of the study provide information that can shed light on the voir dire 
process and suggest avenues for inquiries within RIAS codes.112 
FIGURE 1.  CONVERSATION PROFILE BY RACE, 




For example, we can look at Badgett’s case from multiple angles.  We 
can consider the facts in the case, charging and sentencing decisions, and jury 
selection.  Badgett is a white man; he killed Grover Arthur Kizer, a white 
man.113  Badgett had a history of substance abuse and violence. This was not 
 
112  See generally Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1531; O’Brien, Grosso, Woodworth 
& Taylor, supra note 101, at 1997. 
113  See North Carolina v. Badgett, 644 S.E.2d 206, 209–11 (N.C. 2006) (recounting the 
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his first homicide, or even his first stabbing.  He stabbed a man in the throat 
before committing this murder and was convicted of voluntary manslaughter.  
Some evidence suggests he suffered from psychological illnesses. At the time 
of this crime, Badgett was homeless.  Kizer, who also suffered from a mental 
disability, took him into his house on a particularly cold night. When the 
victim became delusional and agitated, Badgett became frightened and 
stabbed the victim in the throat with a pocket knife and slashed his arm. 
Badgett later stole items and cash from the victim and his home on at least 
two occasions before the police began investigating. 
The jury found the case death-eligible because of his prior record and 
evidence that he committed the murder for pecuniary gain.114  The case file 
does not suggest the crime garnered particular attention in the press.115  
Earlier research concluded that cases with at least one white victim were 
more likely to result in a death sentence than all other cases, even after 
controlling for other theoretically and statistically important information 
about the circumstances of the crime and the defendant.116  Other than that 
legally impermissible factor, this case does not stand out as particularly 
aggravated among other death-eligible homicides.117 
Despite potentially strong mitigation, the conversations during jury 
selection in Badgett’s case largely focused on issues that are fairly standard 
in voir dire—the potential jurors’ familiarity with the case and potential 
witnesses.  Because this was a capital case, the court and lawyers spend a 
substantial amount of time on the potential jurors’ attitudes about the death 
penalty.  However, besides a few questions about the potential jurors’ 
feelings and prior experiences with mental health professionals, the 
conversation focused primarily on general attitudes and the potential jurors’ 
backgrounds and occupations. Defense counsel’s voir dire strategy 
foreshadowed their trial strategy, as they did not present any mitigating 
 
facts of the crime and the trial). 
114  Id. at 223. 
115  Several local news articles printed several paragraphs each on the murder; none seem 
to have placed it on the front page or in the front section.  Kathi Keys, Suspect Arrested in 
Death of City Man, THE COURIER-TRIB., Dec. 2, 2002, at 2A; Mark Brumley, Ex-Convict 
Arrested in Homicide: Records Show John Scott Badgett—Charged with Murder in a Weekend 
Homicide—Killed A Man Years Ago, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., B1, Dec. 3, 2002, at B1; 
Mark Brumley, Man Charged with Murder in Stabbing: John Scott Badgett, Who Served Four 
Years in Prison for Another Stabbing Death, is Accused of Killing Grover Arthur Kiser, 
GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., B1, Dec. 5, 2002, at B1. 
116  O’Brien, Grosso, Woodworth & Taylor, supra note 101, at 1998. 
117  See id. at 2027 (presenting fully controlled logistic regression models documenting 
those factors associated with a highly aggravated case in North Carolina during this time 
period). 
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evidence to the jury at trial.  This seems out of step with the kind of defense 
representation that would have been standard practice in 2004 when this trial 
took place.118 
Another issue not raised in voir dire was race, but race is nevertheless 
an important backdrop to understanding this case. Badgett’s case was tried in 
Randolph County, North Carolina.  Randolph County was almost 6% black 
at the time of Badgett’s trial.119 The representation of African-Americans was 
lower on Badgett’s venire, including only three African Americans among 
67 people, 4%.  Otherwise, the venire was 94% white (63/67), and 1% other 
(1/67).120  Not one of the black venire members in Badgett’s case was excused 
for cause. The prosecutor, however, struck two of the three during jury 
selection (68%).  He struck an even higher number of qualified white venire 
members (9), but a lower percent of this group’s total, 26% (9/35), and did 
not strike the venire member whose race was “other.”  The seated jury 
including alternates was 86% white (12/14), including one African-
American.121 
The conversation profiles in Badgett’s case are based on the actual 
conversations in voir dire that led to this result but they are limited in that 
they offer the broadest possible view of the data.  Looking more closely at 
information we have about the case and individual jurors in the case may 
provide a focus with the RIAS coded conversations.  For example, our 
previous study documented that the each of the black jurors—the same jurors 
struck by the prosecution and included in this study—had characteristics of 
 
118  See ABA Guidelines for Capital Defense, Guideline 10.11(A) (2003), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_represent
ation/2003guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf (“[C]ounsel at every stage of the case have a 
continuing duty to investigate issues bearing upon penalty and to seek information that 
supports mitigation.”). 
119  Population of Randolph County, North Carolina: Census 2010 and 2000 Interactive 
Map, Demographics, Statistics, Graphs, Quick Facts, CENSUSVIEWER, 
http://censusviewer.com/county/NC/Randolph [https://perma.cc/V2FV-KNYB] (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2017). 
120  The person coded as other described himself as “other” in the jury questionnaire and 
to the North Carolina Board of Elections. We do not have additional information about his 
race. 
121  In comparison, the purposive sample of venire members with at least one of the target 
characteristics was 6.1% black (2/33) and 93.9% white (31/33).  None of the black venire 
members in the sample were excused for cause, but 61.3% of the white potential jurors were 
excused (19/31).  Among venire members qualified to serve, the state struck all of the black 
venire members in the sample (2/2), and 33.3% of the white venire members (4/12).  Three 
white jurors from the sample were seated on the jury, and no black jurors in the sample were 
seated. 
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concern to prosecutors.122 
One juror expressed reservations about the death penalty.  Not enough 
concern to be excused for cause, but enough that her transcript includes 
questions about her opinions about the death penalty.  We suspect from 
earlier work in these transcripts that questioning about death penalty opinions 
may be an area requiring particular attention. 
Compare, for example, the following two transcript excerpts.  They 
involve the same prosecutor, but different potential jurors, concerning their 
views about the death penalty.  The first except comes from voir dire of a 
white juror.123 
Prosecutor: Do you have feelings about either [life imprisonment without parole or the 
death penalty]? 
White Juror: I’m kind of against the death penalty, but it’s in our system. 
Prosecutor: Can you tell me a little about what makes you feel that way? 
White Juror: I don’t know. Just – I mean to kill somebody seems wrong. But if 
somebody killed somebody . . . they could get the death penalty if that’s what the finding 
was. 
Prosecutor: If I’m hearing you correctly, it sounds like you’re opposed to killing, period. 
And that if you were a jury member, even though you were generally opposed to killing, 
you could consider both possible punishments? 
White Juror: Yes, sir. 
Prosecutor: And you could vote for the death penalty even though you’re not really in 
favor of it, if that’s the law . . . . You could still vote for it? 
White Juror: Yes, sir. 
The prosecutor passed this juror, but struck the black juror whose exchange 
with the prosecutor appears in the next transcript excerpt.124 
Prosecutor: Could you tell me what your thoughts or feelings are about both of those 
punishments, life imprisonment without parole and the death penalty? 
Black Juror: I believe if you commit a crime, you deserve your punishment. And if it’s 
the death penalty, I think you should get it. I really—I don’t feel it’s right, but if it’s the 
law, it’s the law. That’s how I feel. 
Prosecutor: So personal preferences, as opposed to what the law is, you don’t feel that 
the death penalty is an appropriate punishment? 
 
122  See Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1531, tbl. 5. 
123  Transcript of Jury Selection at 1018–19, State v. Williams, No. 01 CRS 63278 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004). 
124  Id. 
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Black Juror: um, I . . . 
Prosecutor: Or I shouldn’t say that it’s “appropriate.” You just don’t think it’s right to 
have the death penalty? . . .  From your personal point of view, regardless of what the 
law . . . is, do you think that you have some personal reservation about the death 
penalty? 
Black Juror: No. 
Prosecutor: If you had your druthers, would you rather not sit on a case where the death 
penalty might be an appropriate punishment or might be a punishment that you had to 
consider? 
Black Juror: It wouldn’t matter. 
The prosecutor is faced with very similar assertions by jurors in the very 
same case: they personally do not favor the death penalty, but believe that the 
law must be followed regardless of their personal beliefs. The prosecutor 
follows up these assertions, however, with quite different tactics.  In the first 
instance, the prosecutor engages in a process known as “rehabilitation” of the 
juror, providing the juror through leading questions with an answer that 
reconciles the juror’s discomfort with capital punishment with the prospect 
of imposing it. The prosecutor focuses on the juror’s stated respect for the 
law as it stands.  In response to the second juror, however, the prosecutor 
focuses on the juror’s personal beliefs and suggests that she would prefer not 
to serve. 
This work with conversation profiles focuses our attention again on 
those parts of these transcripts.  A next step might be to look for the codes 
included in the “conflict” component of the conversation profile within the 
section of the transcripts addressing death penalty reservations to see if 
patterns emerge.  The codes capture expressions of concern, criticism, 
disapproval or disagreement.  They include leading questions.  The transcript 
sections excerpted above include utterances that would be coded within this 
category. 
The second juror reported that he knew the defendant.  Unlike death 
penalty reservations, we did not target jurors for inclusion in this study based 
on knowledge of trial participants.  We would not have known to look for 
“conflict” codes in these parts of the conversation.  This too may be fruitful 
in understanding how trial participants seek information and how the 
behavior varies by race. 
It might also be fruitful to compare the conversation profiles in cases 
with a larger proportion of black venire members to those with a smaller 
proportion.  Profiles might also vary between especially aggravated cases and 
those, like Badgett’s, that are less aggravated.  Each of the subprojects 
presented here are intended to demonstrate the capacity of the coded text to 
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address the question that underlies the project as a whole. 
V. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
This research makes two significant contributions to the literature.  First, 
it adapts a rigorous and exacting method of conversation analysis to the legal 
setting.  This method provides the tools to subject the elusive process of jury 
selection to systematic review.  Second, by using this method, this research 
then provides a first look at the actual questioning of potential jurors that 
precedes the decision to seat or strike a juror, or to excuse her for cause. 
We undertook this project in light of both clear evidence of racial 
disparities in jury selection in the underlying data and prosecutors’ earnest 
claims that race does not enter their minds when picking a jury. Our intensive 
work with the jury selection transcripts brought subtle instances of disparate 
questioning to our attention; these instances in turn raised a question about 
the role of subtle psychological processes in exacerbating and perpetuating 
race effects. 
Consider the transcript sections above—did the prosecutor engage in 
this disparate behavior knowingly?  Did the judge and defense counsel hear 
this difference and not intervene?  We suspect not.  This shift seems 
exceedingly subtle, especially when compared to the differential questioning 
the Court addressed in Miller-El, which may serve as a kind of public 
benchmark.125  Comparing transcript excerpts like those raised our concern 
that more subtle disparities in the process of questioning jurors may 
contribute to the disparate exercise of the kinds of peremptory strikes 
documented in our earlier research.  Moreover, the differences in how 
prosecutors talk to jurors of different races may be more subtle, but also more 
pervasive, than the example we present above, and a better understanding of 
disparate behavior may strengthen judicial oversight. 
RIAS coding provided a method for systematic analyses of discourse.  
RIAS characterizes precisely the verbal interactions that occur in a 
conversation and the context in which they occur.126  RIAS, however, was 
 
125  In Miller-El, prosecutors deployed a “graphic description” of how death-sentenced 
prisoners were executed in Texas, intended to increase the potential juror’s reservations about 
the death penalty, with 53% of black jurors but only 6% of white jurors. David C. Baldus, 
Catherine M. Grosso, Robert Dunham, George Woodworth & Richard Newell, Statistical 
Proof of Racial Discrimination in the Use of Peremptory Challenges: The Impact and Promise 
of the Miller-El Line of Cases, As Reflected in the Experience of One Philadelphia Capital 
Case, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1425, 1436 (2012) (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 260 
(2005)). 
126  See generally Roter & Larson, supra note 17 (2001). 
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developed to capture nuances of medical conversations rather than those 
examining jurors for criminal trials.127  Traditional RIAS coding categories 
had been tailored to analyze exchanges that involved different objectives and 
motivations than those of jury selection. 
We revised the codes to reflect the content and context of legal 
proceedings.  This methodology provides a systematic look at the actual 
process of jury selection. This paper presents the project as a whole.  We 
expect to present additional findings in the future.  In the meantime, we 
expect that the adapted RIAS codes may provide useful to legal researchers. 
The RIAS methodology has been tested and refined for decades in the 
public health context;128 ours is the first study that adapts it to the legal 
setting.  The new methods open new avenues for research, but also suggest 
caution.  The data presented here is a first step in untangling the nuances of 
conversations leading to the decision to strike, pass, or excuse a juror for 
cause, and to provide an important foundation for future research. 
  
 
127  See supra Part II; Roter & Larson, supra note 64 (2002). 
128  See supra Part II.C. 
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APPENDIX 1.  DIRECTORY OF TEXT CODES 
(Adapted from Roter Interaction Analysis System Codebook. 
http://riasworks.com) 
 
 Code Tag Definition 
1.    Agreement Agree Signs of agreement or 
understanding. 
2.    Approve—Direct Approve Compliments directed to 
the other person present or 
showing of gratitude or 
appreciation. Any 
expression of approval, 
praising, rewarding or 
showing respect or 
admiration directed to the 
other. 
3.    Asks for Permission ?Perm Questions that ask for 
permission to proceed. 
4.    Asks for Reassurance ?Reassure Questions of concern that 
convey the need or desire 
to be reassured or 
encouraged.  Voice tone, 
intonation and emotional 
content may help 
distinguish questions that 
ask for reassurance from 
other questions. 
5.    Asks for 
Understanding 
?Understand Mechanism by which the 
speaker checks with the 
other to see if information 
that was just said has been 
followed or understood 
(i.e., in essence asking, 
“Do you understand what 
I’m saying?”). 
6.    Back-Channel 
Responses 
(Attorney/Court Only) 
BC Indicators of sustained 
interest, attentive listening 
or encouragement when 
the listener does not hold 
or take the speaking floor. 
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 Code Tag Definition 
7.    Bid for Repetition Bid Request for repetition of 
the other’s previous 
statement.  Bids are used 
when words or statements 
have not been clearly 
heard, and therefore need 
repetition, and are often 
signs of perceptual 
difficulties. 
8.    Checks for 
Understanding 
Check Mechanisms by which the 
speaker re-states 
information to check for 
accuracy or to confirm a 
shared understanding of 
the facts being discussed 
(i.e., in essence asking, 
“Do I understand what you 
are saying?” “Do I have it 
right?” or “Am I on the 
right track?”). 
9.    
 
Closed [Case Specific 
Legal] Information 
Question 
[?]CS Asks closed question about 
case specific facts & 
knowledge. 
10.    Closed [Case Specific 
Legal] Opinion 
Question 
[?]ØCS Asks closed opinion 
question about case 
specific facts & 
knowledge. 
11.    Closed [General Legal] 
Information Question 
[?]GL Asks closed question about 
general legal facts & 
knowledge. 
12.    Closed [General Legal] 
Opinion Question 
[?]ØGL Asks closed opinion 
question about general 
legal facts & knowledge. 
13.    Closed [Personal 
Legal] Information 
Question 
[?]PL Asks closed question about 
personal legal facts & 
knowledge. 
14.    Closed [Personal 
Legal] Opinion 
Question 
[?]ØPL Asks closed opinion 
question about personal 
legal facts & knowledge. 
15.    Closed [Personal] 
Information Question 
[?]P Asks closed question about 
personal facts & 
knowledge. 
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 Code Tag Definition 
16.    Closed [Personal] 
Opinion Question 
[?]ØP Asks closed opinion 
question about personal 
facts & knowledge. 
17.    Compliment (General) Comp Compliments directed to 
the group in general or to 
others not involved in the 
exchange showing 
gratitude or appreciation.  
Any expression of 
approval, praise, or 
showing respect or 
admiration directed to the 
group in general. 
18.    Concern Concern A statement that indicates 
that a condition or event is 
serious, worrisome, 
distressing or deserving 
special attention and is of 
particular concern now 
during the encounter.  
Voice tone, intonation or 
verbal content may 
disclose that worries, 
concerns, events or 
uncertainties are of 
immediate concern.  
Includes statements that 
ask for pardon and indicate 
concern for the other. 
19.    Criticism (General) Crit Any indication of 
disapproval, complaint, 
rejection, coolness, or 
disbelief directed toward 
the group in general or to 
others not involved in the 
exchange. 
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 Code Tag Definition 
20.    Disapprove or 
Disagreement (Direct) 
Dis Any indication of 
disapproval, criticism, 
complaint, rejection, 
coolness or disbelief 
directed to the other person 
present.  Statements that 
contradict or refute 
something said by the 
other, or imply 
disagreement with or 
rejection of the other’s 
hypotheses, ideas or 
opinions. 
21.    Empathy/Legitimizing 
Statements 
Emp Statements that paraphrase, 
interpret, name or 
recognize the emotional 
state of the other person.  
Statements that indicate 
that the other’s emotional 




22.    Gives [Case Specific 
Legal] Information 
GivesCS Gives case specific 
information. 
23.    Gives [Case Specific 
Legal] Opinion 
GivesØCS Gives case specific 
opinion. 
24.    Gives [General Legal] 
Information 
GivesGL Gives general legal 
information. 
25.    Gives [General Legal] 
Opinion 
GivesØGL Gives general legal 
opinion. 
26.    Gives [Personal Legal] 
Information 
GivesPL Gives personal legal 
information. 
27.    Gives [Personal Legal] 
Opinion 
GivesØPL Gives personal legal 
opinion. 
28.    Gives [Personal] 
Information 
GivesP Gives personal 
information. 
29.    Gives [Personal] 
Opinion 
GivesØP Gives personal opinion. 
30.    Laughs, Tells Jokes Laugh Friendly jokes, trying to 
amuse or entertain, light 
banter. Laughter and 
nervous laughter. 
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 Code Tag Definition 
31.    Leading Question—
Negative 
LNeg Suggests an answer.  
Usually calls for yes/no 
response.  Adds/assumes 
information that the juror 
had not already provided, 
and 
makes the juror appear less 
fit to serve 
32.    Leading Question—
Positive 
LPos Suggests an answer.  
Usually calls for yes/no 
response.  Adds/assumes 
information that the juror 
had not already provided, 
and 
makes the juror appear 
more fit to serve. 
33.    Open [Case Specific 
Legal] Information 
Question 
?CS Asks open question about 
case specific facts & 
knowledge. 
34.    Open [Case Specific 
Legal] Opinion 
Question 
?ØCS Asks open opinion 
question about case 
specific facts & 
knowledge. 
35.    Open [General Legal] 
Information Question 
?GL Asks open question about 
general legal facts & 
knowledge. 
36.    Open [General Legal] 
Opinion Question 
?ØGL Asks open opinion 
question about general 
legal facts & knowledge. 
37.    Open [Personal Legal] 
Information Question 
?PL Asks open question about 
personal legal facts & 
knowledge. 
38.    Open [Personal Legal] 
Opinion Question 
?ØPL Asks open opinion 
question about personal 
legal facts & knowledge. 
39.    Open [Personal] 
Information Question 
?P Asks open question about 
personal facts & 
knowledge. 
40.    Open [Personal] 
Opinion Question 
?ØP Asks open opinion 
question about personal 
facts & knowledge. 
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 Code Tag Definition 
41.    Orient Orient Gives instructions.  
Statements that tell the 
other person what is about 
to happen, what is 
expected, or serve to orient 
the other to the major 
topics of discussion or 
procedures. 
42.    Partnership Statements 
(Attorney/Court Only) 
Partner Statements that convey 
alliance with the other in 
terms of help and support. 
43.    Personal Remarks/ 
Social Chit Chat 
Chat Greetings and goodbyes.  
Social conversation. 
44.    Reassure, Encourages 
or Shows Optimism 
R/O A statement that indicates 
optimism, encouragement, 
relief of worry or 
reassurance. Includes 
statements that show an 
awareness of the other’s 
feelings in a positive 
upbeat way, or respond to a 
request for reassurance. 
45.    Self-Disclosure 
Statements 
(Attorney/Court Only) 
SDis Statements that describe 
the speaker’s personal 
experiences in areas that 
have legal and/or 
emotional relevance for the 
venire member.  Self-
disclosure is the revealing 
of a non-public personal 
component. 
46.    Transition Words Tran Sentence fragments that 
indicate movement to 
another topic or area of 
discussion, train of thought 
or action.  Includes 
statements or fragments 
that are place-holders, if 
the utterance stands alone. 
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APPENDIX 2.  INITIAL CONVERSATION PROFILE DEFINITION 
 Component Variables Included 
1. Data Gathering 
 
Open [Case Specific Legal] Information Question 
Open [Case Specific Legal] Opinion Question 
Open [General Legal] Information Question 
Open [General Legal] Opinion Question 
Open [Personal Legal] Information Question 
Open [Personal Legal] Opinion Question 
Open [Personal] Information Question 
Open [Personal] Opinion Question 
Closed [Case Specific Legal] Information 
Question 
Closed [Case Specific Legal] Opinion Question 
Closed [General Legal] Information Question 
Closed [General Legal] Opinion Question 
Closed [Personal Legal] Information Question 
Closed [Personal Legal] Opinion Question 
Closed [Personal] Information Question 
Closed [Personal] Opinion Question 




Gives [Case Specific Legal] Information 
Gives [Case Specific Legal] Opinion 
Gives [General Legal] Information 
Gives [General Legal] Opinion 
Gives [Personal Legal] Information 
Gives [Personal Legal] Opinion 
Gives [Personal] Information 
Gives [Personal] Opinion 
Orient 
 
3. Relationship Building 
 
Approve (Direct) 
Asks for Permission 
Asks for Reassurance 
Asks for Understanding 
Compliment (General) 
Empathy/Legitimizing Statements 
Laughs, Tells Jokes 
Partnership Statements (Attorney/Court Only) 
Personal Remarks/Social Chit Chat 







Disapprove or Disagreement (Direct) 
Leading Negative 
Leading Positive 
 
 
